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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
)
)
Plaintiff-Respondent,
)
)
)
V.
)
CODY CLARK BAKER,
)
)
Defendant-Appellant.
)
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _)
STATE OF IDAHO,

NO. 47399-2019
ADA COUNTY NO. CR0l-19-11099

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Cody Baker contends the district court abused its discretion by imposing and executing
an excessive sentence in this case. As such, this Court should either reduce his sentence as it
deems appropriate or, alternatively, remand the case to the district court for a new sentencing
hearing.

Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
In what the district court aptly described as an "explosion of anger that quickly spread
into a major conflagration because of the group of people that were involved," (Tr., p.35,
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Ls.9-11 ), a group of people, including Mr. Baker, decided to kill Sarita Morgan. 1 (See, e.g.,
Tr., p.39, Ls.4-6.) However, Mr. Baker came to his senses during the attack and stopped it short,
though it still resulted in significant injuries to Ms. Morgan.

(See, e.g., Tr., p.28, Ls.8-15

(defense counsel noting Mr. Baker's role in stopping the attack); Tr., p.15, Ls.10-20 (Mr. Baker
admitting to the nature of Ms. Morgan's injuries as part of his guilty plea).)
Mr. Baker immediately accepted responsibility for his not-insignificant role in the attack
by pleading guilty to aiding and abetting aggravated battery at the first opportunity and agreeing
to pay restitution. (Tr., p.5, Ls.14-23; R., p.36 (pleading guilty at his arraignment hearing in
district court).) Defense counsel noted Mr. Baker's decision to accept responsibility from the
outset was not made in the hopes of getting a better deal from the State. 2 (See Tr., p.28, Ls.2-7.)
In addition, Mr. Baker provided testimony in the trial of one of his co-defendants. (Tr., p.39,
Ls.24-25 (the district court finding he was largely honest in that testimony).) He also offered an
apology to Ms. Morgan, expressing his remorse for her injuries resulting from this incident.
(Tr., p.33, L.21 - p.34, L.3.)
Although this offense occurred six months after Mr. Baker topped out a previous
sentence, (see PSI, p.4 (the presentence investigator noting that Mr. Baker had not been paroled
likely due to disciplinary issues while incarcerated and his refusing the opportunity at parole

1

The victim is in the case identifies as female and prefers the name Sarita Morgan. (Presentence
Investigation Report (PSI), p.1212 (the victim's impact statement noting "the legal system knows
me [as] Nicholas Wurst"); see also Tr., p.35, Ls.5-9 (the district court specifically fmding the
attack was not motivated by the victim's gender preference).) This brief will refer to her
accordingly. (See, e.g., Tr., p.23, Ls.1-7 (the prosecutor doing the same below).)
Continuing in the vein of avoiding confusion, citations herein to "PSI" are to the
electronic document "Baker 47399 psi," and citations to "sealed" are to the electronic document
"Baker 47399 sealed."
2
However, a plea agreement was ultimately reached between the parties, and it provided for
open sentencing recommendations and the State agreeing not to file a persistent violator
enhancement. (See R., pp.43-45.)
2

during his prior sentence)), defense counsel pointed out it was not consistent with Mr. Baker's
prior criminal history. (Tr., p.26, Ls.10-21; see generally PSI, pp.25-28 (indicating Mr. Baker's
criminal history consisted mostly of property-based or theft-type offenses).) Defense counsel
explained that part of the underlying problem in this case was that Mr. Baker's application for
disability upon release had run into complications, and without that resource, he experienced
housing issues and did not have access to Medicaid assistance to help him get treatment for his
mental health issues. (Tr., p.30, Ls.2-8, 19-20.) The records at IDOC confirmed that Mr. Baker
had been diagnosed with "Bipolar Disorder with Psychotic Features, PTSD [post-traumatic stress
disorder], ADHD [attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder], aggression, and anger." (PSI, p.4.)
Defense counsel explained that these conditions were related, in no small part, to Mr. Baker's
abusive childhood. (Tr., p.28, L.16 - p.29, L.19.)
Another effect of his abusive childhood, defense counsel explained, was that Mr. Baker
did not feel strong connections to his own family members and would, as a result, seek out
surrogate family members. (Tr., p.28, L.16 - p.29, L.19.) That is, in fact, what he had done with
his co-defendants in this case. (See Tr., p.29, Ls.4-14.) As such, defense counsel recommended
a period of probation or retained jurisdiction so that Mr. Baker could consolidate a plan with
appropriate supervision to adequately address these issues in the community.

(Tr., p.30,

L.24 - p.31, L.9.) As to the underlying sentence, defense counsel simply recommended the
district court impose something less than the unified term of fifteen years, with nine years fixed,
recommended by the State. (See Tr., p.31, L.21 - p.32, L.21.)
The district court acknowledged Mr. Baker's acceptance of responsibility and his
cooperation with authorities, as well as his abusive childhood and the resulting mental health
issues. (Tr., p.36, L.10 - p.37, L.11, p.39, Ls.4-25.) However, it concluded the only safe place
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for Mr. Baker to address his issues was within an institutional setting because this incident
happened so soon after being "placed on parole." (Tr., p.40, Ls.4-5, 17-22.) It also found a
period of retained jurisdiction to be inappropriate due to "the extreme failure" of a period of
retained jurisdiction which occurred nearly ten years before, when Mr. Baker had "refused to
participate" in a rider program. (Tr., p.41, Ls.2-4; see PSI, p.28 (discussing the prior period of
retained jurisdiction, which occurred in 2010).) As such, it imposed and executed a unified
sentence of fifteen years, with seven years fixed. (Tr., p.40, Ls.23-25.)
Mr. Baker filed a notice of appeal timely from the resulting judgment of conviction.
(R., pp.51-55.)

ISSUE
Whether the district court abused its discretion by imposing and executing an excessive sentence
on Mr. Baker.

ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Imposing And Executing An Excessive Sentence
On Mr. Baker
Sentencing decisions are committed to the district court's discretion. State v. Reinke, 103
Idaho 771, 771 (Ct. App. 1982). Where a defendant contends that the sentencing court imposed
an excessively harsh sentence, the appellate court will conduct an independent review of the
record, giving consideration to the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the
protection of the public interest. See id. at 772. Accordingly, in order to show an abuse of
discretion in the district court's sentencing decision, he must show that, in light of the governing
criteria, the sentence is excessive considering any view of the facts. State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho
293, 294 (1997); see Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863-64 (2018) (articulating the
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standard for reviewing whether the district court abused its discretion). The governing criteria,
or sentencing objectives, are: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the
public generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for
wrongdoing. State v. Charboneau, 124 Idaho 497, 500 (1993).
The protection of society is the primary objective the court should consider. Id. The
Idaho Supreme Court has indicated that rehabilitation is usually the first means the district court
should consider to achieve that goal. See State v. McCoy, 94 Idaho 236, 240 (1971), superseded
on other grounds as stated in State v. Theil, 158 Idaho 103 (2015); accord State v. Bickhart, 164

Idaho 204, 206 (Ct. App. 2018) (noting the preference identified in McCoy does not preclude a
sentence of incarceration, if that is ultimately the best method to achieve the goals of
sentencing). In other words, while the district court may place significant weight on one of the
goals of sentencing, that does not mean it can ignore mitigating factors speaking to one of the
other goals as being insignificant or unimportant. See State v. Knighton, 143 Idaho 318, 320
(2006) (noting that the failure to sufficiently consider various mitigating factors has resulted in
abuses of sentencing discretion in several cases).
The district court's decision in this case was actually premised on a misunderstanding of
the relevant facts. It stated that the only place Mr. Baker could safely address his mental health
issues was in an institutional setting because this event happened so soon after he was "placed on
parole." (Tr., p.40, Ls.4-5, 17-22.) However, Mr. Baker was not on parole at the time of this
offense - he had topped out his prior sentence. (See, e.g., PSI, p.4 (the parole commission noting
it "[ d]oesn't look like we've ever paroled him," which, the presentence investigator suggested
was likely due to disciplinary issues while incarcerated and Mr. Baker refusing the opportunity at
parole).)
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The reason that misunderstanding is problematic is it contains the inference that
Mr. Baker engaged in this conduct in contravention of the requirements and support structures
that would have been in place as part of parole supervision. Indeed, Mr. Bakers actions would
likely be even more concerning than they already are if they happened while he had access to the
support structures which parole supervision would have provided him. In fact, that is precisely
the issue defense counsel sought to address by recommending for a period of probation in this
case. However, since Mr. Baker was not subject to parole supervision and did not have access to
the associated support and network, including that factor, even inferentially, in the sentencing
calculus was an abuse of discretion.

Cf State v. Van Kamen, 160 Idaho 534, 540 (2016)

(explaining that, while the district court could have reached the same sentencing decision in a
proper manner, the actual words it used to explain its decision demonstrated it had, in fact,
considered an improper factor, and as such, that decision had to be vacated).
Moreover, a sufficient consideration of the actual factors in this case supports the
conclusion that a more lenient sentence was appropriate in Mr. Baker's case. Certainly, the
nature of his initial actions in this case were aggravating.

However, the fact that it was

Mr. Baker who ultimately put a stop to the battery is also important in that regard. So, too, is his
immediate acknowledgment of his guilt and acceptance of responsibility for his actions in that
regard, particularly without the benefit of a plea agreement. See, e.g. State v. Kellis, 148 Idaho
812, 815 (Ct. App. 2010). Likewise, the fact that he apologized to Ms. Morgan, expressing
remorse for the effects of his actions, indicates a more lenient sentence is appropriate, as does his
willingness to pay restitution for the costs associated with those effects. See, e.g., Cook v. State,
145 Idaho 482, 489 (Ct. App. 2008) (explaining the defendant's expression of remorse and
willingness to pay restitution, among other factors, justified a more lenient sentence).
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His

cooperation with authorities in regard to his testimony at his co-defendant's trial also reinforces
that conclusion. See, e.g., State v. James, 112 Idaho 239, 243 (Ct. App. 1986).
Additionally, a more rehabilitation-focused sentence, such as the one recommended by
defense counsel below, is appropriate in light of Mr. Baker's abusive childhood, particularly
since it served as a precursor to the mental health issues which played a significant role in this
particular offense. Compare State v. Williams, 135 Idaho 618, 620 (Ct. App. 2001) (explaining
the district court needed to sufficiently consider the defendant's abusive childhood, which was a
precursor to the drug abuse issues which played a role in the offense in that case); see also
Hollon v. State, 132 Idaho 573, 581 (1999) (reiterating that the defendant's mental health issues

themselves should be weighed in mitigation). The ability to adequately address those mental
health issues, which Mr. Baker did not have at the time of this offense because his disability
application ran into complications, would help reduce the risk by supervision in the community,
whether before or after a period of retained jurisdiction. The nature of the offense, while serious,
did not ipso facto require execution of the sentences in order to adequately serve the other goals
of sentencing.

(See Tr., p.31, Ls. I 0-20 (defense counsel noting that one of the other

co-defendants received a rider for her actions in this case).)
To that point, the district court was unwilling to consider a period of retained jurisdiction
because, ten years earlier, Mr. Baker had refused to participate in a rider program. (Tr., p.41,
Ls.2-4.) However, the point of a period of retained jurisdiction is to provide the district court
with additional time and information to assess the defendant's current potential and suitability
for probation, not his potential for probation ten years ago. See State v. Lee, 117 Idaho 203, 205
(Ct. App. 1990). That Mr. Baker refused programming a decade ago, when he was only
(see PSI, pp.23, 27), does not mean he would necessarily reject programming now
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that he is nearing

. More importantly, it does not mean that the rider program

would not provide more information about his current potential and suitability for probation,
especially since some rider programs have changed in the interim. See Betsy Z. Russell, "Idaho
prisons halt treatment program that was actually leading to more recidivism," THE SPOKESMANREVIEW,

Sept. 18, 2015, available at https://www.spokesman.com/blogs/boise/2015/sep/18/

idaho-prisons-halt-treatment-program-actually-was-leading-more-recidivism/.

Additionally, a

period of retained jurisdiction would have addressed the district court's other concerns, as
Mr. Baker would receive access to treatment programs in an incarcerated setting during that
time. Besides, the district court could always relinquish jurisdiction if he refused, or otherwise
failed to complete, the rider program during that period of retained jurisdiction.
As such, a sufficient consideration of all the mitigating factors alongside the aggravating
factors reveals a more lenient sentence, such as a suspended sentence or period of retained
jurisdiction, would better serve all the goals of sentencing in this case. Therefore, the district
court abused its discretion by imposing and executing Mr. Baker's sentence in this case without
sufficiently considering all those factors, especially since its decision was based on a
misunderstanding of the relevant facts.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Baker respectfully requests that this Court reduce his sentence as it deems
appropriate. Alternatively, he requests that his case be remanded to the district court for a new
sentencing hearing.
DATED this 26 th day of May, 2020.
/s/ Brian R. Dickson
BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 26 th day of May, 2020, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing APPELLANT'S BRIEF, to be served as follows:
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
E-Service: ecf@ag.idaho.gov

/s/ Evan A. Smith
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant

BRD/eas
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